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Abstract: In 1765, the British Parliament imposed stamp duties on the 
American colonies, setting in motion the chain of events which ulti-
mately led to the American Revolution. This paper analyzes the prac-
ticalities of the Stamp Act to provide insights into the way in which 
a tax instrument that was successful in one setting failed to achieve 
similar success in another. The reasons for choosing stamp duties as 
an appropriate fiscal measure, the colonial reaction to the tax, and 
the way in which the tax was accounted for by the British government 
bureaucracy are examined. The paper demonstrates the value of us-
ing an accounting lens to provide a more nuanced interpretation of 
the Stamp Act crisis.
INTRODUCTION
Taxation lies at the heart of the relationship between the 
state and its subjects and is intertwined with accounting. Its de-
sign is informed by accounting and its implementation creates 
new accountings for both the state and the subject. The purpose 
of this paper is to examine a particular incarnation of taxation 
– the imperial stamp duty imposed by the British Parliament 
on the American colonies briefly from 1765 to 1766, the demise 
of which is referred to as the “Stamp Act crisis.” The version of 
stamp duty imposed on the colonies bore strong resemblance 
to that in operation in Great Britain with some modifications 
to accommodate colonial conditions. By the middle of the 18th 
century, a stamp duty had become an accepted part of the tax 
landscape in Britain, and the administrative machinery by 
which it was collected was firmly established. In view of this, the 
vehement rejection of a similar impost by the colonists was not 
a response that was either anticipated or expected. The response 
by the colonists can, we argue, be partly attributed to inadequate 
design. The British government failed to consider fully the logis-
tical difficulties that would arise in putting the stamp duty in 
place in a remote location.
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As a precursor to the American Revolution, the Stamp Act 
crisis is an important object of study. Indeed, much has been 
written about it in terms of its broader political implications 
[Morgan and Morgan, 1953; Gipson, 1954; Morgan, 1973; Thom-
as, 1975; Bullion, 1982] and from the perspective of contempo-
rary ideology [Bailyn, 1967]. We have, however, identified a gap 
in the literature as little has been written about the Stamp Act 
crisis from the viewpoint of its logistics. The questions of how it 
was to be administered, what problems were associated with its 
implementation, and how the proceeds were accounted for have 
rarely been addressed. In this paper, we consider the practicali-
ties of the Stamp Act, its initial design, and the mechanics of its 
operation, so as to provide insight into a neglected aspect of the 
crisis and the method of accounting. This paper also makes a 
contribution to the literature relating to 18th century taxation in 
a colonial setting, another topic on which little has been written.
The focus of our examination is a set of accounts discussed 
below. These were drawn up in 1772, and provide clear evi-
dence in an accounting context of the failure of the stamp duty 
to  operate as planned. We consider these, together with other 
primary source documents, and formulate an additional ex-
planation for the failure of the imperial Stamp Act. The episode 
highlights the difficulties in achieving action at a distance in a 
pre-modern setting. The set of audited accounts, contained in 
the National Archives, followed the return of unused stamped 
paper to Britain and relate specifically to the “American Stamp 
Duties” [N.A.: AO3/10861]. The main account, shown in Figure 
1, is supported by a number of subsidiary accounts. In order to 
explain the way in which the final version of the Stamp Act was 
administered, we draw on these accounts, which raise a number 
of questions about the logistics of implementing the stamp duty. 
Although referred to in passing by a number of commentators, 
we have been unable to uncover any systematic attempt to 
unravel and explicate the 1772 American Stamp Act accounts, 
other than a description of its contents in Koeppel [1976]. The 
accounts provide a fascinating glimpse into the convoluted way 
in which the process of handling the stamped paper was man-
aged between the various actors responsible for putting the 
Stamp Act into operation. Unfortunately, we have been unable 
to locate the underlying working papers and, as a result, some 
1 An explanation of the references from the U.K. National Archives (N.A.) and 
the British Library (BM) can be found at the end of the paper for those unfamiliar 
with them.
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of the entries depicted in the accounts cannot be verified or even 
explained.
A cursory examination raises some interesting issues to 
which this paper will refer; for example, the role of the ware-
house keepers, one of unstamped goods and one of stamped 
goods. In addition, there is the matter of only £4,000 recorded 
as received for a tax that was predicted to produce significantly 
more revenue, the cancellation of stamped paper to the value of 
approximately £155,000, and the outstanding balances due from 
the stamp distributors in the colonies. All of these are evidence 
of the signal failure of the Stamp Act in America.
EXCURSUS: HISTORIOGRAPHY OF  
THE STAMP ACT CRISIS
Lamb [2003] stresses the importance of engagement with 
wider scholarship, not only within the accounting history field, 
but also beyond to areas in which general historical literature 
deals with issues of concern to the accounting historian. There 
is a rich and established literature around the Stamp Act crisis, 
and, at this point, it is apposite to clarify our contribution. Some 
of the documents to which we refer have not been prominent in 
the literature, in particular the accounts which we reproduce in 
this paper. The American historiography of the Stamp Act crisis 
remains dominated by the work of the Morgans, specifically 
The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution. Breen [1997, p. 
14] notes that in 1957, Morgan “effectively shifted the focus of 
research from the metropolitan centre to the colonial periph-
ery.” Consequently, as British historians busied themselves with 
remapping 18th century British politics and culture, American 
historians tended to ignore “the English side of the story.”
In the opinion of Hecht [1976], few aspects of the American 
Revolution have been more thoroughly studied. She divides into 
three streams the “vantage points” from which the Stamp Act 
crisis is viewed. The first considers the Stamp Act crisis as an 
essentially American phenomenon. Indeed, this is the approach 
taken by the Morgans and by Bailyn [1967], who examined the 
ideological arguments based on careful analysis of pamphlets 
and other literature. The second is a wider approach that con-
siders the colonial events in the light of a broader imperial 
context as adopted in Gipson’s work [1954]. Finally, a number of 
historians approach the topic from a purely British perspective 
[e.g., Ritcheson, 1954]. Thomas [1975] conducts a microanalysis 
of British politics of the period. Langford [1976, p. 394], in a re-
3
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view of Thomas, proclaimed it the definitive account, and went 
so far as to say that “the story of the stamp act crisis will certain-
ly not need telling again.” Breen [1997, p. 15] comments that, by 
the 1980s, there was evidence of an “interpretive shift” in studies 
of 18th century England, with revisionist accounts shifting the 
focus from “elite political life” to, for example, “the development 
and maturation of an impressive fiscal military state.”
Bullion [1982], again from the third of Hecht’s vantage 
points, focused on George Grenville. Langford [1985, pp. 897-
898] reviewing this work in 1985, suggested that while Bullion 
offered more detail than his predecessors, “on most important 
questions...major conclusions have been reached and the per-
missible area of debate long since reduced to a minimum attain-
able on the evidence available.” We suggest that from an ideo-
logical, political, and constitutional perspective, Langford may 
well be justified in saying that the topic has been exhausted. We 
argue, however, that there is still room for a more finely grained 
analysis of events and outcomes through our exploration of the 
accounting evidence, particularly through the examination of 
contemporary accounting documents not previously traversed in 
detail in the literature. Rose and Miller [1992, p. 177] advocate 
consideration of how the “state is articulated into the activity of 
government, that is, the various elements, devices, techniques, 
knowledge, to make operable the tactics of government.” In our 
view, the failure of the Stamp Act can also be attributed to a 
failure to consider the detail of achieving action at a distance. 
In this regard, existing analyses of the Stamp Act crisis are defi-
cient in that they fail to consider the logistical detail of how the 
Stamp Act was to work. They also fail to examine the specific 
items that were subject to the tax and the then-existing colonial 
taxes.
This paper redresses these omissions by examining the ac-
counts, together with other primary source documents detailing 
the practicalities of the operation of the imperial Stamp Act. 
The outcome is a better understanding of accounting, particu-
larly tax accounting, in an imperial context, and an explanation 
of the conditions under which a tax instrument successful in 
one setting may fail in another. Accounting historians are well 
aware of the neglect of accounts and accounting information by 
historians. As Napier [1991] notes, in the context of aristocratic 
accounting, historians readily draw on evidence of accounts but 
rarely provide detailed descriptions of them. An accounting lens 
can provide valuable, alternative explanations for events and 
5
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transitions.2 It is not our intention to displace, or even disrupt, 
established views of the origins of and motivations underpinning 
the Stamp Act crisis. Rather, by using accounting evidence, we 
aim to present another factor previously neglected by historians 
to allow for an additional interpretation of the events. Much at-
tention is given elsewhere to political rationalities in analyses of 
government, including the ways in which power is exercised and 
the role and extent of politics. Less attention is generally given 
to the actual technologies deployed in putting governmental op-
erations into practice [Rose and Miller, 1990, p. 175].
This paper also sheds light on the nature of 18th century 
taxation in a colonial setting. The dearth of tax history in the ac-
counting history literature has been discussed elsewhere [Lamb, 
2003; Oats and Sadler, 2004; Noguchi, 2005]. The Stamp Act cri-
sis represents an important episode in tax history. It highlights 
the difficulties in imposing an imperial tax across the globe at a 
time when communication mechanisms meant significant delays 
in relaying information between the center in Britain and the 
periphery in the colonies. Any tax is underpinned by accounting 
techniques and practices, requiring their deployment by both 
the taxing state and the taxed subject. The design of tax instru-
ments is at one level driven by ideological considerations, but 
putting a new tax into place and making it work requires careful 
consideration of the practicalities of its operation and its impact 
on those actors whose job it is to make the tax work effectively.
This paper adds to the accounting history literature in 
three main ways. First, it adds to our understanding of account-
ing, particularly tax accounting, in an imperial context. Unlike 
Hooper and Kearns [1997], Neu [1999, 2000], Kalpagam [2000], 
Davie [2003], Bush and Maltby [2004], and Neu and Graham 
[2006], we are not concerned with the use of accounting to con-
trol the indigenous populations of colonies. The object of this 
investigation is imperial control over mid-18th century settler 
colonists. Similarly, while work that deals with accounting in co-
lonial America, such as Baxter [2004] and Schultz and Hollister 
[2004], certainly exists, this paper is concerned with accounting 
for colonial America. Second, it sheds light on the conditions 
under which a tax instrument which is successful in one setting 
fails to achieve that success in another, a failure to achieve ac-
2 Bryer [2000a, 2000b, 2004, 2005, 2006], for example, has shown that an ac-
counting lens can be used to map the transition from feudalism to capitalism and 
has thereby added a new dynamic to the debate around the emergence of capital-
ist mentalities. 
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tion at a distance. Finally, the accounts drawn up by the British 
government some six years after the abolition of the stamp duty 
provide an interesting glimpse into the nature of government ac-
counting in mid-18th century Britain. The accounts were not for 
the purposes of “calculating the loss” on this failed venture, but 
rather to reflect the stewardship obligations imposed on those 
responsible for the collection of the tax. This is consistent with 
the residual feudal mentality still extant in the mid-18th century. 
While changes were under way in accounting for profit-making 
ventures, in particular the adoption of double-entry bookkeep-
ing, government accounts continued primarily to use charge and 
discharge.
We conclude that the British Government underestimated 
both the logistics of implementing a complex form of taxation 
across vast geographical distances and the strength of the re-
sistance movement in the local setting. The story of the imperial 
Stamp Act is one of failure, and many explanations have been 
posited for this failure. This study proposes another, previously 
neglected, explanation, that the design of the operation of the 
Stamp Act was flawed and the impracticalities of its imple-
mentation contributed significantly to its downfall. Successful 
implementation of action at a distance requires a process of 
translation [Robson, 1992; Preston, 2006] which the British gov-
ernment failed to achieve.
The remainder of this paper is comprised of three parts. 
Part one begins with a short contextual review of the relation-
ship between the American colonies and Britain. This is fol-
lowed by an outline of both the rationale for the choice of stamp 
duty as a fiscal instrument appropriate to extract revenue from 
the colonists, and the accounting techniques by which it was 
brought into existence and its intended maintenance. Part two 
examines the colonial reaction to the tax and its subsequent 
repeal. Part three offers some insights into the way in which 
the short-lived Stamp Act was accounted for by the British 
government bureaucracy, leaving aside the wider philosophical 
and ideological debates which are, as noted above, dealt with 
adequately elsewhere.
BACKGROUND: TAXATION IN AND OF  
THE AMERICAN COLONIES
In 1700, there were only 200,000 inhabitants in the Ameri-
can colonies, but by 1770, its non-indigenous population had 
risen to over two million [Plumb, 1963, p. 124]. By the mid-18th 
7
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century, there were 13 British mainland colonies, together with 
eight island colonies in the western Atlantic and Caribbean Sea, 
each with representative institutions which enjoyed a certain 
commonality despite markedly different economic and social 
conditions. Each colony was separate from an imperial point 
of view and had different initial forms of constitution, although 
over the course of the first half of the 18th century, there was 
a tendency “towards assimilation of colonial governments to a 
single pattern” [Beloff, 1965, p. 448]. 
The governors of the colonies derived their functions from 
the sovereign and acted as heads of civil administration. As-
semblies were elected as decision-making bodies, although 
“their legislative functions were subordinate to those of the 
Imperial parliament” [Beloff, 1965, p. 448]. By the 18th century, 
each colony was represented by an agent in London, men who 
knew Westminster and were able to act as parliamentary lobby-
ists. Beloff [1965] notes that British attempts to tighten imperial 
control had begun in the 1750s, but the Seven Years’ War3 in-
tervened. Under mercantilist ideology, the reason for a colonial 
empire was to derive economic benefit from it so that regulation 
of trade was fundamental government policy. By 1763, however, 
increasing evidence of evasion signaled the need for an overhaul 
[Ritcheson, 1953, p. 544; Thomas, 1975, p. 44]. It was with 
this in mind that Prime Minister Grenville’s administration of 
1763-1765 acted as it did in relation to colonial legislation. For 
Grenville, “it was a simple matter of justice that the eastern sea-
board colonies who would profit greatly from a regulation of the 
new west and who would enjoy military protection from attack, 
should carry at least a share of the financial burden largely aris-
ing from services performed in their behalf” [Ritcheson, 1953, 
p. 545]. While the colonists did not deny the imperial right to 
regulate trade, they were opposed to the new rules regarding the 
prosecution of offences, particularly the increased use of vice-
admiralty courts.
Rationale for Stamp Duties: Stamp duties were first introduced 
in Britain in 1694 and were a well-established and acceptable 
form of taxation by the mid-18th century. Hughes [1941] pro-
vides a comprehensive discussion of their introduction and 
development up to the period immediately preceding the Stamp 
3 The Seven Years’ War is referred to as the French and Indian War in Amer-
ica.
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Act crisis.4 Blackstone [1766, pp. 312-313] described in his Com-
mentaries the range and extent of British stamp duties. His list 
included items such as parchment or paper containing details of 
legal proceedings, licenses for retailing wines, almanacs, news-
papers, advertisements, and pamphlets of less than six sheets 
of paper. After noting that the tax greatly increased the cost of 
mercantile and legal proceedings, Blackstone defended it as 
providing a means of authenticating documents and that made 
forgery more difficult.
Based on notions of fairness in taxation at the time, stamp 
duties were an appropriate and widespread form of revenue 
exaction. What is significant, in the context of this paper, is 
that stamp duties require the cooperation of the taxpayer who 
is responsible for ensuring that relevant documents and other 
dutiable items are appropriately stamped. The attraction of 
stamp duty as a revenue-raising measure to the state, compared 
to other forms of taxation, is further demonstrated by a debate 
that took place in the New York General Assembly [1766] during 
which James Delancey on August 6, 1755, said:
I have thought of three of the following: a poll tax of 
ten shillings or more on every slave from fifteen to fifty 
years of age, an excise upon tea and a stamp duty. The 
first cannot be thought heavy, as none but persons of 
substance possess slaves, and the tax will fall equally 
according to men’s abilities; the second is a tax upon a 
superfluity of pernicious consequence to the health and 
purses of the people, and therefore a proper object of a 
tax, and the third [the stamp duty] will be so diffused as 
to be in a manner insensible.
Diffuse incidence was seen as a virtue of the stamp tax in 
that the burden was spread across a wider section of society. The 
individual burden was thus lower than the more targeted forms 
of tax aimed at the wealthy alone, such as land tax in Britain 
and slave taxes in the colonies. On the other hand, another ad-
ministrative virtue of the stamp tax was its visibility; payment of 
the tax was denoted by a clear mark or cipher, an issue to which 
we will return later in the paper.
By mid-century, Britain had established a sturdy financial 
system, underpinned by “legions of new bureaucrats” (tax collec-
tors and inspectors) as well as a “new consumer marketplace,” 
4 See also Dowell [1873], although he does not canvass the full range of stamp 
duties considering those such as on newspapers and playing cards to be aberrant 
and focuses instead on duties placed on legal documents.
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developments which pre-date the industrial revolution and the 
increased prominence of the middle class [Breen, 1997, p. 19]. 
Breen argues that these developments fed into the “birth of a 
powerfully self confident British nationalism” (more narrowly, 
English nationalism) which can be viewed as a factor contribut-
ing to the eventual rejection of the Stamp Act by the colonists.
The Treaty of Paris of 1763 ended the Seven Years’ War. 
Bullion [1982, p. 12] suggests that the idea of colonial taxation 
began to be discussed informally soon after.5 In March 1763, 
the King wrote to Bute that “[t]he subject was new to none, 
having been thought of the whole winter.” The King also noted 
that “every branch of government” had considered the question 
of taxing America. In June 1762, Charles Jenkinson, Secretary 
to the Treasury, produced a paper entitled Observations on the 
Money Faculties of the State in which he demonstrated that the 
increased burden of taxation in Britain was £1,400,000 per an-
num. Consequently, he concluded that the government had no 
choice but to impose new taxes, but as new taxes diminished 
the revenue arising from old taxes, the nation’s capacity to meet 
debts “was very considerably impaired.”6 Discussions about 
the need for a new tax therefore revolved around accounting 
calculations of the quantum of the national debt, the existing 
burden of taxation in Britain, and the circumscribed potential to 
increase that burden further.
The Treasury decision relating to the taxation of America 
was not made purely on fiscal grounds. Commercial consider-
ations also came into play; hence, Grenville’s statement to the 
House of Commons that the “great object” of the proposals was 
to “reconcile the regulation of commerce with an increase of 
5 The idea of Britain imposing a stamp duty on the colonies was not new; 
extension of the duty to the colonies had been suggested in 1722, 1726, 1728, and 
1742 [Thomas, 1975, p. 69]. Sir W. Keith, exchequer-deputy governor of Virginia, 
had also suggested it to Walpole in the wake of the 1733 excise crisis, who rejected 
the idea, stating: “I have Old England set against me and do you think I will have 
new England likewise” [Dowell, 1888, p. 150]? In 1751, Henry McCulloh, a Lon-
don merchant with land speculation in North Carolina, suggested a stamp duty 
for the colonies to Lord Halifax, the then-president of the Board of Trade, and, in 
1757, submitted a scheme for a poll tax and a stamp duty [Ritcheson, 1953, p. 549; 
Thomas, 1975, p. 69]. In addition, one of the secretaries to the treasury, Samuel 
Martin, had, in 1759, recommended to Newcastle the imposition of a stamp tax 
on the colonists [Bullion, 1982, p. 12].
6 Liverpool Papers [BM Add Ms 38334 f.233-238], quoted in Bullion [1982, 
p. 19]
10
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revenue.”7 In Britain, there was a general acceptance of Parlia-
ment’s authority, and taxes were on the whole paid regularly 
(that is not to say there was no tax evasion). In planning to tax 
the colonies, resistance was anticipated as the government 
recognized that similar conditions did not pertain there. This 
awareness influenced the choice of tax instrument to be adopted 
[Bullion, 1982, p. 2]. Grenville and his ministers were acutely at-
tuned to the need to secure colonial support for their decisions 
and that the prevailing mood in the American colonies was not 
receptive to imperial interference. 
It was against this background that on March 9, 1764, 
Grenville announced his intention to levy a stamp duty on the 
colonies in a year’s time. This statement was made at the time 
of the passage through Parliament of the Sugar Act. Grenville 
stated that in delaying the introduction of a stamp duty, he was 
allowing the colonies to formulate alternative plans for raising 
revenue, although it seems that this was not made explicit to the 
colonial assemblies [Morgan, 1973, p. 24].8 In Grenville’s opin-
ion, the Stamp Act was an appropriate basis for Anglo-American 
relations, putting British and colonial taxpayers on the same 
footing and establishing that America should rightly contribute 
to the cost of its defense [Lawson, 1980, p. 561].
One significant factor which may have led Grenville to 
choose a stamp duty for the colonies is the prior use of such 
taxes by the colonies themselves. Although not specifically dis-
cussed in Kozub’s [1983] wide-ranging survey of colonial taxes, a 
stamp duty was used in Massachusetts in 1755 and New York in 
1757. The New York tax included a stamp duty of ½d. per copy 
on newspapers, against which James Parker protested [McA-
near, 1941], drawing on the arguments of Swift in relation to the 
British newspaper stamp introduced in 1712 [Sadler and Oats, 
2002]. Thompson [1969, p. 257] is of the view that there was 
little popular resistance to these duties, which may well have di-
rectly encouraged Grenville to use a stamp duty to raise colonial 
revenue. In addition, the use of stamp duties in the colonies was 
not confined to the mainland colonies. In Jamaica, a stamp duty 
was imposed from 1760 to 1763 to provide revenues to fund the 
militia in the face of a slave revolt [Spindel, 1977, p. 210].
7 in a speech of March 9, 1965, Ryder Diary [p. 234], quoted in Bullion [1982, 
p. 2]
8 Thomas [1975, p. 72] disputes Morgan’s assertion in this regard and is of the 
view that Grenville did not intend to seek the views of the colonies.
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DESIGNING THE IMPERIAL STAMP DUTY
Having decided to adopt a stamp duty as the most appropri-
ate form of tax in the colonies, it then became necessary to de-
vise specific mechanisms by which it would operate. Miller and 
Rose [1990, p. 2] comment that through “apparently humble 
and mundane mechanisms” such as “techniques of notation, 
computation and calculation,” action at a distance can “incite, 
induce and seduce populations to behave in certain ways.”9 
Robson [1992, pp. 691-693, 696], drawing on Latour [1987, 
1988], discusses the development of accounting as inscriptions 
that enable action at a distance. He notes that relations between 
inscriptions and the things to which they refer are not unam-
biguous, and the extent to which they correspond is influenced 
by the distance between them. Co-location of representation and 
referent minimizes the need for “strong” explanations to achieve 
action, in part due to tacit knowledge shared by the actors. Ac-
tion at a distance, on the other hand, is more problematic, and 
the greater the distance between the actor and the location in 
which the desired action is to take place, the greater the need 
for translation. Here translation suggests “movement or dis-
placement from one context to another.” To act upon a remote 
site, networks are required to “gather, transmit and assimilate 
transcriptions.” Robson goes on to describe the features of 
transcriptions best able to achieve action at a distance, specifi-
cally mobility, stability, and combinability. Mobility is required 
since inscriptions need to be able to “move from the setting to 
actor and back,” an attribute of written documents which can 
be inspected and re-inspected. Stability ensures that inscriptions 
retain the relation to their referents without corruption. Robson 
notes, by reference to Hoskin and Macve [1986], that the devel-
opment of special ways of writing such as alphabetic ordering 
“enhanced the ability of texts to record, reference and retrieve 
information.” The final property of inscriptions that facilitates 
action at a distance is combinability; that is, the ability to be 
combined and recombined “to establish new relationships.” Ac-
counting, with its numerical inscription, is capable of playing an 
important role in achieving action at a distance. By quantifying, 
or ascribing monetary values to concepts, they can be combined 
to form a new concept.
In drawing up a suitable plan for the imposition of a stamp 
9 The term “government” here is used in the Foucauldian sense of the attempt 
to shape rational human conduct beyond its modern political meaning. See, for 
example, Neu [1999].
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duty on the colonies, thought was given to the nature of the du-
ties imposed in Britain, while some consideration was also given 
to the special circumstances of the American colonies, such as 
differences in legal systems and higher levels of poverty. The 
governors of the colonies were requested to produce an account 
of legal documents in use in the colonies. This information, to-
gether with the Massachusetts and New York versions of stamp 
duty, was used to assist in deciding to what the imperial stamp 
would apply (referred to as “heads of duty”) and at what rate. A 
table was drawn up showing the current British heads and rates 
of duty side by side with the colonial duties [N.A.: T1/433/141]. 
These accounts of the local position demonstrate the way in 
which inscriptions are gathered from their remote location, 
combined and recombined at the center, and used to design a 
plan of action to be put into effect back in the local setting.
Work began on the stamp bill in 1763, with two draft ver-
sions submitted to the Treasury for consideration on November 
19, 1763. The version preferred by the Treasury was one drawn 
up by Thomas Cruwys, solicitor to the Stamp Office.10 Thomas 
Whately, joint secretary to the Treasury Board, presented a 
report to the Board outlining the features and rationale of the 
stamp bill. He stated that the rates of duty in the colonies were 
necessarily different to those in England as the same legal in-
struments were not always used in both places and, in some in-
stances, a different rate of duty may be appropriate for the same 
instrument.11 
Whately’s report recommended two new heads of duty in 
the colonies. One was on Crown grants of land and the other on 
registration of conveyances and securities; that is, the registers 
themselves were taxed as well as the legal documents. In com-
parison with the duties in place in Britain, higher duties in the 
colonies were proposed for the system of registering transfers 
of land. In addition, for reasons that are not clear, the decision 
10 The other version was drafted by Henry McCulloh, who was largely in agree-
ment with Cruwys as to the nature of the duties that should be imposed, but dif-
fered as to the use to which the funds should be put. Cruwys did not specify how 
the funds raised were to be deployed, whereas McCulloh apparently held strong 
views on this and believed the revenue arising from the stamp duty should be used 
“to provide presents for Indians; to pay rangers for frontiers; for the maintenance 
of the king’s forts and garrisons; to encourage settlers and settlements in frontier 
parts”; and finally, “to discharge the salaries of the kings [sic] governors and of-
ficers abroad” [quoted in Thomas, 1975, p. 71].
11 The full text of Whately’s report can be found in BM Add Ms 35910 f.310-
323 and is partly reproduced in Hughes [1941] and Koeppel [1976].
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was taken to subject documents in foreign languages (includ-
ing newspapers) to double the rate of duty. There were to be 
lower duties in the colonies for legal proceedings and bonds in 
light of the higher levels of both poverty and litigiousness in the 
colonies. The rate of duty on retail licenses for the sale of ale, 
cider, and spirits was also lower than in Britain. Two items of 
duty which applied in Britain were not imposed in the colonies, 
specifically that on admission to corporations and that on inden-
tures.12
The final bill was handed to the Treasury on January 24, 
1764 [Thomas, 1975, p. 71]. As noted earlier, in deciding how the 
stamp duty would operate, to which instruments and objects it 
would apply, and to what extent, some consideration was given 
to the particular circumstances of the colonies. It is not possible 
merely to recreate rules and regulations that exist in another 
location. Success of regulatory control is dependent on its be-
ing tailored for the specific circumstances of the location of its 
operation.13 As noted by Robson [1992], the greater the distance 
from the center of decision making to the location of enactment, 
the more translation or information is required to overcome the 
difficulties of distance. Information about legal instruments in 
use in the colonies played an important role in the design of the 
stamp duties, in choosing which documents would be subjected 
to the duties, and how much tax would be charged on each.
One factor which was not taken into account in deciding 
what form an imperial tax should take, which is also a neglected 
area in the historiography of the Stamp Act crisis, is the extent 
to which the colonial assemblies imposed other forms of taxes, 
often with great ingenuity. It seems that the British government 
failed to consider adequately the nature of the other taxes in 
place or had been previously imposed in the individual colonies. 
Kozub [1983] documents the array of taxes imposed by the colo-
nial governments and concludes that the “colonial forefathers” 
attempted in their design of tax instruments to measure the fac-
ulty or ability of individuals to pay the taxes. Indeed, several col-
12 Other heads of duty remained largely the same and taxes at the same rates 
as in Britain. It was decided to retain the duty on admission to professions and 
degrees so as to “keep mean persons out of those situations in life which they 
disgrace” [BM Add Ms 35910].
13 In a contemporary tax context, a growing body of research deals with this 
notion. See, for example, the work of the Centre for Tax System Integrity at the 
Australian National University (http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/) and Law and Policy (2007), 
volume 29, issue 1, which is devoted to the notion of responsive regulation in taxa-
tion.
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onies imposed taxes actually designated as “faculty taxes” which 
were taxes on the assumed income of specific occupations. In 
Connecticut, for example, it applied to attorneys. Residents of 
Massachusetts, in particular, were heavily taxed compared to 
other colonies.14 The imposition of an imperial stamp duty then 
would impact unevenly throughout the colonies, which raised 
questions akin to those subsequently debated in the context of 
federal taxing powers.15
Grenville intended to introduce the stamp duty in 1764. In 
his budget speech of that year, he indicated that he considered 
the stamp duty to be the “least exceptionable because it requires 
fewer officers and even collects itself. The only danger is forg-
ery” [Thomas, 1975, p. 74]. Clearly Grenville failed to appreciate 
the complexity of implementing the tax in the colonies and the 
extent to which it would inflame the colonists. Objections were 
raised during debate, however, and the progress of the bill was 
halted. Opponents suggested that the colonies should be ap-
prised of Parliament’s intentions [Thomas, 1975]. The response 
from the colonies was a series of protests sent by the assemblies 
of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New York, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia.
As concern over the implications of a colonial stamp tax 
rose, the colonial agents met with Grenville on May 17, 1765 to 
clarify the position. There are several accounts by witnesses to 
this meeting, including one by Jasper Mauduit whose brother 
was present and who reported the meeting to the Massachusetts 
Assembly on May 26, 1765 [Morgan, 1973, p. 27]. Echoing Gren-
ville’s 1764 budget speech, Mauduit stated that Grenville had 
suggested that, of the available forms of taxation, “the stamps 
was the most equal, required the fewest officers, and was at-
tended with the least Expence in the Collecting it.” Recognizing 
14 There are a number of individual studies of the taxes in various colonies pri-
or to independence. Gipson [1931, p. 721] examines the tax burdens on residents 
of Connecticut, which Jared Ingersoll said in 1765 was: “Eighty Thousand Pounds 
in Debt, Arrears of Taxes, that cannot be collected by Reason of the Poverty of 
these on whom they are laid.” Henderson [1990] notes the difference with respect 
to colonial taxation and subsequent state taxation between the Chesapeake and 
New England colonies, particularly Massachusetts and Virginia. He attributes 
these variations to differences in cultural and demographic factors, including the 
prevalence of slaves, which affected the types of tax instrument used in those 
colonies as well as the incidence of taxes.
15 Crane [2006] discusses the first federal stamp taxes imposed in 1798, and 
their role in the downfall of the Federalists. Notwithstanding the grant of taxing 
power to the federal government, there were persistent concerns that some meas-
ures were too intrusive upon state autonomy. 
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that the preferred choice would be no tax at all, but given the 
necessity of imposing some form of revenue-raising measure, 
the colonies were expected to assent or request appropriate 
modifications. When one of the colonial agents asked for details 
of the heads of duty, Grenville apparently replied that “it was not 
necessary. That everyone knows the stamp laws here; and that 
this Bill is intended to be form’d upon the same plan.” Benjamin 
Franklin proposed an alternative to the stamp duty as a means 
of raising colonial revenue in the form of a plan for a paper 
currency for the colonies. Later, in 1766, he reflected that “Mr. 
Grenville paid little attention to it [Franklin’s alternative pro-
posal], being besotted with his Stamp Scheme, which he rather 
chose to carry through” [Labaree, 1968, p. 48]. 
In another conference with four of the colonial agents on 
February 2, 1765, an attempt was made to forestall the imple-
mentation of the Stamp Act. By the time the bill reached its 
second reading on February 15, the agents presented colonial 
petitions against it, which were not, however, admitted into the 
House of Commons [Morgan, 1973].
It seems that there was a change in the underlying purpose 
of the Stamp Act during the 12-month delay in its implementa-
tion. On November 5, 1764, Whately explained to John Temple, 
Surveyor General of Customs for the Northern District of Amer-
ica, that finance was the motivation behind the bill. By February 
9, 1765, once the colonies’ objections to the new tax were known 
in Britain, he stated that “it establishes the right of Parliament 
to levy an internal tax on the colonies” [Thomas, 1975, p. 85].
The “peel of remonstrance which sounded across the Atlan-
tic found an echo” in England where merchants were concerned 
about the ability of the Americans to pay their debts, which at 
the time were apparently in the vicinity of £4,000,000 [Dowell, 
1888, p. 152]. “The Grenville ministry did not proceed with the 
Stamp Act in ignorance of colonial opinion, but thought the 
measure would be accepted without protest” [Thomas, 1975, p. 
88]. We return to the question of the colonial resistance in the 
next section of the paper.
During the passage of the bill, 28 speeches were made by 
18 different members; there were 55 resolutions and numer-
ous alterations and additions which prolonged its passage by 
two days. There was no debate in the House of Lords, and the 
Commons was informed on March 8 that the bill had passed 
without amendment. Royal assent was received on March 22, 
1765 [Thomas, 1975, p. 98]. After the third reading of the bill on 
February 27, Thomas Cruwys drew up the bonds for the stamp 
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distributors. Over 50 different duties were imposed, the highest 
being £10 on licenses for solicitors and attorneys. There was 
little opposition in either the House of Commons or the Lords; 
indeed, according to Burke, “[t]here scarcely ever was less oppo-
sition to a bill of consequence.”16 In addition, there was little in-
dication that the tax would be as controversial as it subsequently 
turned out to be [Sosin, 1958].
In support of the contention that the act was carefully de-
signed for colonial sensibilities, Thomas [1975, p. 99] notes five 
points which represent reasons why the measure should have 
been acceptable to the colonists:
the total tax to be raised by the bill was quite small;1. 
the stamp duty was chosen as it was considered to be 2. 
equitable in terms of its burden;
the detailed variations from the British duties at the time 3. 
reflected careful consideration of the particular circum-
stances in the colonies;
the money raised by the tax was to stay in the colonies 4. 
(although there was some confusion in this regard); and 
it was to be administered by leading men resident in the 5. 
various colonies.
The choice of a stamp duty to extract revenue from the colo-
nists was sensible for Britain on a number of grounds. The im-
pact of the tax was not concentrated onto one particular section, 
such as the wealthy, but was widely dispersed across a broad 
cross-section of colonial society. The design of the administra-
tion of the tax was also such that it required the active partici-
pation of taxpayers. Evidence of payment of the tax was highly 
visible, and, yet, because it was built into the cost of undertak-
ing the transaction that was the subject of the duty, it could be 
interpreted as merely an increase in ultimate price compared 
to other taxes, such as the tax on slaves, which required pay-
ment without anything visible being received in return. These 
justifications seem reasonable on the face of it, but as will be 
discussed below, an interpretation of the accounts in Figure 1 
suggest that the way in which policy makers envisaged that the 
stamp duty would operate was unduly complex and insensitive 
to the situation in the affected colonies.
16 Edmund Burke’s “Speech on American Taxation” [quoted in Dowell, 1888, 
p. 150]. For the full text of this speech, see Langford [1981, pp. 406-462].
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PUTTING THE STAMP DUTY INTO OPERATION
The administration of the stamp duty was to be tightly 
controlled by the British stamp commissioners. In presenting 
the final proposals for the stamp duty to the Treasury Board, 
Whately discussed the additional costs of administering the 
new tax, specifically “an increase in salary to the Secretary, the 
Receiver General and Comptroller, a small increase in salary to 
the first clerks of those officers, two additional clerks…[and] an 
additional porter to the warehouse and [almost as an aside] a 
warehouse” [BM Add Ms 35910 f.323].
It was recommended that the British authorities be respon-
sible for the supply of all the stamped paper and parchment, 
and it was conceded that “the quantities…may be difficult to 
ascertain at first, but…will be easy to furnish afterwards.” This 
deserves a little more thought, bearing in mind the number of 
objects of this tax and the different denominations of duty po-
tentially applicable, it is quite an understatement to suggest that 
the quantities may be “difficult to ascertain.” To determine what 
types of paper were to use for which transactions and to arrange 
for them to be stamped using one of 30 dies specially designed 
for the purpose was difficult enough. But then to further al-
locate these sheets among the 13 mainland colonies and the 
island colonies, all of which had different degrees of commercial 
sophistication, was an enormous accounting task. In addition to 
the calculation of the value of the stamps, the cost of the paper 
and parchment also had to be computed and marked on the pa-
per. In this way, the government also controlled the price which 
taxpayers ultimately paid for the paper they were forced to use 
in order to comply with the tax.
It was intended that, at least initially, the paper be stamped 
in London and then transported to the colonies for dispatch to 
the various stamp distributors appointed in each colony. This 
may have been an interim measure to get the Stamp Act up and 
running. Certainly Benjamin Franklin indicated by letter of June 
8, 1765 to his partner David Hall an expectation that a stamp 
office would be set up in Philadelphia for stamping paper for 
newspapers and almanacs in due course [Labaree, 1968, p. 65]. 
The stamps that were prepared for use for stamping colonial 
newspapers were of three values – halfpenny, penny, and two-
pence. The design of the stamps consisted of a royal crown with 
the sword and scepter crossed at the back in the center of the 
stamp, surrounded by the garter with the inscription honi soit 
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qui mal y pense.17 Above the garter band was heraldic mantling 
with the word “America” at the top [Turner, 1941]. Figure 2 
shows the purchase of blank paper and parchment from Tonson 
& Co. stationers, subsequently placed in the charge of the ware-
house keeper of unstamped goods. The values at which these 
transactions were recorded appear to be historical cost.
FIGURE 2
American Stamp Duties General Account by
Virtue of an Act of Parliament &c Tonson & Co Stationers
£ s D 1765 £ s D
Parchment
488 8 - Augst 2nd
By Warehouse Keeper 
of Unstampt Goods
3,599 8 11
Paper Blanks & 
Printing Paper
3,118 15 9 Octr 31st
Do
337 7 6
Profit by Discount 
thereon
Parchment at 12pr 
Cent
66 12 -
Paper at 10pr Cent 263 - 8
3,936 16 5 3,936 16 5
Source: N.A. AO3/1086
Unlike Continental European incarnations of the stamp 
duty, such as in France where the government had a monopoly 
over the stamped paper and its supply, the paper for the British 
version was purchased by taxpayers, taken to the stamp office 
for stamping, and then used as required (e.g., overprinted as 
newspapers). This system could not feasibly be instituted in the 
American colonies without costly investment in the stamping 
equipment necessary to stamp the paper. In this regard, how-
ever, three colonies had previously levied their own stamp duties 
and presumably had the equipment in place to facilitate stamp-
ing there. This is one of the problematic operational features of 
the Stamp Act which exacerbated the resistance to it. Forcing 
taxpayers to purchase pre-stamped paper shipped from Britain 
provided a constant and visible reminder of the nature of the 
tax as an imperial imposition. Had the paper been stamped in 
situ, its visibility as an externally imposed duty would have been 
17 the motto of the Order of the Garter, which can be loosely translated as 
“Shame on he who thinks evil of it”
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diminished. In addition, the accounts in Figure 1 show that it 
was commercial stationers who provided the paper and that two 
warehouse keepers were employed in its storage and handling. 
These factors were additional cost and administrative burdens 
borne in Great Britain, but any ancillary benefits, such as busi-
ness and employment opportunities, accrued to Great Britain. 
If the colonies themselves had been entrusted with the local 
procurement, stamping, and storage of paper, providing employ-
ment for colonists and furthering business in the colonies, there 
would have been some benefit in amelioration of the burden, 
and the stamp duty may have been better received.
For the purposes of the administration of the Stamp Act, the 
colonies were divided into nine districts, each with an inspector 
answerable to a new American Stamp Office of five commission-
ers in London [Thomas, 1975, p. 100]. The districts were subdi-
vided into areas for which stamp distributors were responsible 
(see Figure 4). The creation of a new tax with its concomitant 
administrative structure provided opportunities for new roles. 
In the mid-18th century, patronage was the norm. Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, ambitious men saw opportunities for profit and 
advancement in obtaining posts within the new administrative 
structure. Of paramount importance to the successful admin-
istration of the stamp duty was the role of stamp distributor. It 
was proposed that a head distributor be appointed in the capital 
of each province that “must be a responsible person and give 
large security.” The head distributor would be charged with stor-
ing and distributing the stamped paper, collecting the appropri-
ate tax, and remitting it to the British exchequer. Distributors 
were to be remunerated by an 8% commission on monies col-
lected and were reimbursed for postage and carriage costs [N.A. 
T1/439 f.93].
There was some competition for the stamp distributor posts, 
which is a fairly clear indication that the violence of the resis-
tance was not anticipated. Three Americans in London at the 
time secured posts – Colonel Mercer from Virginia, Jared Inger-
soll for Connecticut, and George Meserve from New Hampshire. 
On May 14, 1765, Martin Howard Jr., a Rhode Island lawyer, 
wrote to Benjamin Franklin seeking his support for a post in the 
stamp office [Labaree, 1968, pp. 129-130]:
The English prints acquaint Us that it is probable, a Na-
tive of each Colony will be appointed Receiver of Stamp 
Duties. Should this be the Case, it may possibly fall in 
your Way, as you are an American, to recommend some 
persons for that purpose. If no other Connection claims 
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the Preference, I would ask your Friendship to name me 
for that office, or any other in the Stamp Office which 
you may think worth accepting…”
Sensitive to the possibility of resistance, these new distribu-
tors were proposed to be Americans to avoid inflaming colonists 
by imposing British tax collectors upon them. The appointment 
of Americans to the role of distributor can be interpreted as an 
attempt to form an actor network necessary to implement action 
in the local setting [Preston, 2006, p. 561].
In recognition that a large volume of the stamped paper 
would be used for legal matters, it was proposed to use the 
clerks of county and circuit courts to assist in the distribution 
of stamped paper to more remote locations. The distribution 
of stamped paper and collection of the tax would be overseen 
by inspectors, as it was in Britain, who would be empowered to 
travel across the colonies and act as auditors of the collection 
process. Inspectors were to receive a salary of £100 per an-
num, commencing on the day of leaving England, plus 20s. per 
diem to cover expenses of traveling in the course of their duties 
[T1/439 f.92].
FIGURE 3
Warehouse Keeper of Stampt Goods
1765 £ s D 1765 £ s D
Oct 31st to Stampt 
goods received 
from the Teller
222,506 11 6½ Oct 31st
By sundry 
consignments 172,586 11 1¾ 
Sept 3rd 
Commissioners 
order paid receiver 
general for stamps
17 17 8
1766
Oct 14th 
Do for parchment 
and paper 
cancelled
49,902 2 8¾ 
222,506 11 6½ 222,506 11 6½ 
Source: N.A.: AO3/1086
Figure 3 is the top part of an account which shows the 
receipt of stamped paper from the teller to whom it had been 
passed by the warehouse keeper of unstamped goods. Figure 3 
also shows how the warehouse keeper of stamped goods dealt 
with the consignment of stamped paper received from the teller. 
Paper and parchment to the value of £172,586.11s.1¾d. was 
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consigned to the distributors appointed in the American colo-
nies. The value of the paper and parchment in this account ap-
pears to be inclusive of the stamp duty. Figure 4 is an extract 
from a “distributors’ abstract” which shows how this first con-
signment of stamped paper was allocated among the various 
colonial distributors. For the purposes of this section, only the 
first five columns are relevant. Figure 4 serves to reinforce the 
complexity of the calculations required to achieve this result. 
Based on the returns previously provided by the governors of 
each colony as to the nature and type of transactions conducted 
at each location, decisions were taken as to the volume of each 
size and type of paper and parchment that would be required 
to meet the needs of each individual colony. The reason for the 
transfers from Montreal to Quebec and back (see Figure 7 for 
the contra entries) is not clear. The allocation of identical values 
of paper to Bermuda and the Bahamas would appear to be arbi-
trary and related to there being only one distributor responsible 
for both locations. This account of the consignments for each 
distributor shows the way in which combinability is brought 
into play as a feature of accounting inscriptions necessary to en-
able action at a distance [Robson, 1992]. 
Another potential sensitivity to be addressed in the design 
of the stamp duty was the way in which the proceeds were to be 
remitted to the British exchequer. Specie was in short supply in 
the colonies at the time, and there was concern that this duty 
would further drain the supply. It is not clear whether the origi-
nal intention was to ship the proceeds of the Stamp Act back 
to His Majesty’s exchequer in Britain. The Act, when passed, 
required that the duties be paid in sterling values at 5s. 6d. per 
ounce of silver [5 Geo III: C12 s57]. The pragmatic response to 
these concerns was addressed by Whately as follows [BM Add 
Ms 35910 f.323]:
The expense and hazard of remitting the money to be 
raised by this duty may be saved, and the complaint 
of draining the country of money may be obviated by 
a transaction between the Paymaster General and the 
Commissioner of Stamps… 
It was not until July 1765, however, that the Treasury Board or-
dered that receipts be paid over to the deputy paymaster of the 
army in America, with a series of credit transactions in England 
with the Treasury then reconciling the accounts of the offices 
involved [N.A.: T1/439 f.94]. In this way, the Treasury envisaged 
using accounting mechanisms to deal with the flow of funds 
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rather than the physical transfer of specie. Certainly this became 
a point of contention in subsequent protests, and the confusion 
as to whether or not the Stamp Act would be a drain on colonial 
specie [Sosin, 1958] arose largely because of delays in communi-
cation between the imperial center and the colonial periphery. 
While considerable care had been undertaken in the design 
of the new measures to ensure they were appropriately adapted 
to colonial conditions, there were several potential problem 
areas, particularly for the fledgling colonial paper-making and 
printing industries. On February 14, 1765, Benjamin Franklin 
wrote to his partner in the Pennsylvania Gazette that: “I think it 
will affect the printers more than anybody” [Schlesinger, 1935, 
p. 66]. The tax on advertisements dealt a bitter blow for colonial 
newspaper advertisements, which generally cost from 2s. to 5s. 
local currency, and to which the addition of a 2s. stamp duty 
would then add, possibly putting advertising out of the reach 
of many businesses and so reducing the profitability of news-
papers. It was expected that the duty on advertisements would 
be reduced to 1s. but, according to Benjamin Franklin, the 
reduction “slipt in passing the bill” [Labaree, 1968, p. 170].18 In 
a letter to his partner David Hall on June 8, 1765, he remained 
optimistic, however, that it would be altered, with other refine-
ments, in the next sitting of Parliament. In addition, the Stamp 
Act required payment in advance of a security for the advertising 
duty by the printers before the stamped paper could be obtained 
as was the practice in Britain [Labaree, 1968, p. 65, fn. 3]. In a 
letter to a colleague on February 14, 1765, Benjamin Franklin 
said [Labaree, 1968, p. 68]:
Every Step in the Law, every Newspaper, Advertise-
ment and Almanack is severely tax’d…. If this should, 
as I imagine it will, occasion less Law, and less Printing, 
‘twill fall particularly hard on us Lawyers and Printers.
In addition, there were problems with differences in the sizes 
and quality of paper used. For example, in Britain, almanacs 
were generally printed on foolscap paper sized 17x13½ inches, 
and it seems the original intention was to ship foolscap to the 
colonies pre-stamped for use in printing almanacs. In Penn-
sylvania, however, almanacs were produced using Demi paper 
18 It seems, however, that he was pragmatic about the tax and viewed it as an 
opportunity as well as a threat. He secured the post of stamp distributor in Phila-
delphia for a friend. He also ordered “100 reams of half-sheets of extraordinary 
size, the kind used by the London Chronicle, in the hope of avoiding the penny tax” 
[Labaree, 1968, p. 65, see also, Schlesinger, 1935, p. 67].
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sized 20x15½ inches. It seems that Benjamin Franklin was able 
to intervene and have Demi sent instead, albeit of a lesser qual-
ity than the foolscap [Labaree, 1968, p. 171]. English paper was 
more expensive, which made the cost of complying with the 
Stamp Act even higher than just the tax itself [Koeppel, 1976, p. 
58].
The requirement to have paper and parchment stamped in 
Britain and then shipped to the colonies was potentially devas-
tating to colonial paper mills. In a letter printed in the London 
Chronicle, August 17-20, 1765, attributed to Charles Thompson 
[Labaree, 1968, p. 186]:
The paper mills, nursed with care and brought to so 
great perfection in this province [Philadelphia] must 
now fall, at the same time the business and trade of the 
Printers is ruined...
Having examined the motivation for the choice of tax 
instrument and the manner in which it was expected to be ad-
ministered, the next part of the paper examines the colonial re-
sponse to the tax. As mentioned earlier, one difference with this 
analysis, compared with other studies of colonial accounting, is 
that the Stamp Act was a failed measure. The colonial resistance 
proved strong enough to force the imperial government to with-
draw the tax a mere six months after the commencement of its 
operation. Another difference is that this study considers all of 
the colonies rather than just the mainland colonies, which more 
adequately reveals the complexity of the colonial response.
THE COLONIAL RESPONSE
Breen [1997, p. 27] marks the 1760s as a turning point, 
prior to which the American colonists were fiercely loyal and 
saw themselves as a valued part of the empire, with equal stand-
ing to British residents. “They believed that the English accepted 
them as full partners in the British Empire, allies in the continu-
ing wars against France, devout defenders of Protestantism, 
and eager participants in an expanding identity.” A significant 
feature of the colonial response to the Stamp Act was the way 
in which it brought the disparate colonies together. The effect 
of British policy subsequent to the Peace of Paris had not been 
even throughout the colonies; for example, the Sugar Act of 
1764 did not affect the southern colonies as much as it did New 
England or the port towns [Pole, 1973, p. 36]. One key differ-
ence with the Stamp Act was its universal impact; it affected all 
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colonies, all of which shared a mutual interest in opposing the 
measure. Colonial ministers preached resistance to the Stamp 
Act, drawing on philosophers such as Milton, Sydney, and Locke 
[Van Tyne, 1913]. Colonial assemblies met to produce various 
resolutions and petitions, while printed newspapers and pam-
phlets added fuel to the fires of resistance. This neither implies 
that the response was uniform nor that there was unanimity in 
the grounds for or against the tax.
In the British view, the right to tax was disassociated with 
the right to parliamentary representation since at the time only 
a small proportion of Englishmen themselves were represented 
[Beloff, 1965]. Brewer [1988, p. 375] notes that “the extent of 
tax resistance in those territories where the legitimacy of parlia-
mentary jurisdiction was challenged” underlined the importance 
of “parliamentary consent in securing effective tax gathering.” 
The colonists distinguished between internal and external taxes 
and were prepared to accept external duties, the main purpose 
of which was to regulate trade. Internal taxes (i.e., those for the 
purpose of revenue raising) were considered to be the province 
of colonial assemblies. In evidence to the Stamp Committee of 
1766, Benjamin Franklin, agent for Philadelphia, stated: “I never 
heard any objection to the right of laying duties to regulate com-
merce, but a right to lay internal taxes was never supposed to 
be in parliament, as we were not represented there” [Labaree, 
1969, p. 137]. Earlier, in 1764, Franklin had said: “two distinct 
Jurisdictions or Powers of Taxing cannot well subsist together in 
the same Country. They will confound and obstruct each other” 
[Slaughter, 1984, p. 4]. There is some debate among historians 
as to how enduring the distinction between internal and external 
taxes was. Wood [1969] maintains that it was dropped after the 
Stamp Act crisis, whereas Bailyn [1967] sees it as part of a wider 
distinction between internal and external government. The 
Morgans [1953] were of the view that the distinction was never a 
popular one. Slaughter [1984], however, maintains that the dis-
tinction remained significant throughout the pre-revolutionary 
period and beyond because it was never really resolved.
News of the Act reached the colonies in April 1765 and, 
subsequently, a number of resolutions were passed opposing the 
Act, first in the Virginian House of Burgesses on May 30, 1765, 
followed by the other colonies. The stamp, which in Britain 
represented evidence of contribution towards the cost of state 
protection, discharge of an obligation, and acknowledgement of 
Parliament’s legitimate right to impose taxes, took on a different 
complexion in the colonies.
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On October 7, 1765, the Stamp Act Congress was held in 
New York, attended by 27 delegates from nine colonies and 
culminating in 14 declarations of principle [Morgan, 1973]. The 
eighth of these stated that the “rights and liberties of the colo-
nists” were subverted by the Stamp Act [Morgan, 1973, p. 45]. 
A memorial to the House of Lords from the colonists expressed 
concern on similar grounds; this was one of several memorials 
and petitions sent to various bodies in Britain [Morgan, 1973, 
p. 66]. The two fundamental “rights” referred to were the right 
to trial by jury and the right to “exemption from taxes but such 
as are imposed on the People by the several Legislatures in these 
Colonies” [Morgan, 1973, p. 66]. A petition to the House of Com-
mons pointed out that there would be serious consequences 
for the commercial interests of Great Britain and her colonies 
should the Stamp Act be put into effect [Morgan, 1973, p. 67].
In addition to the resolutions and petitions formulated by 
the colonial assemblies, the American press was galvanized to 
report the news and to argue the colonial view. A number of 
newspaper articles and pamphlets were published registering 
the outrage of the colonies. Before 1765, “newspapers were 
relatively unimportant as agencies for moulding and reporting 
public opinion” [Dickerson, 1951, p. 454]. In the English press, 
on the other hand, while many were supportive of the colonial 
arguments, others considered the Stamp Act just and equitable. 
The various responses to the Stamp Act, both in the colonies and 
in Britain, are well documented elsewhere.
As well as the official action taken by the colonial assem-
blies, resistance to the Stamp Act comprised boycotting of 
English imports and action to force the resignation of stamp 
distributors [Morgan, 1973, p. 104]. The first manifestation of 
violence in the context of the latter of the two resistance strate-
gies was in Boston on August 14, 1765, followed by Newport on 
August 29, 1765. 
The Stamp Act further aggravated the growing antagonism 
toward heightened British interference partly because, as Schles-
inger [1935, p. 65] pointed out, it was the printers, lawyers, and 
merchants who bore the brunt of the impost, and these were 
the people who “formed the most literate and articulate section 
of the colonial public”. David Ramsay [Schlesinger, 1935, p. 65] 
said: 
It was fortunate for the liberties of America, that News-
papers were the subject of a heavy stamp duty. Print-
ers, when uninfluenced by government, have generally 
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 arranged themselves on the side of liberty, nor are they 
less remarkable for attention to the profits of their pro-
fession. A Stamp Duty, which openly invaded the first, 
and threatened a great diminution of the last, provided 
their united zealous opposition.
In the main, however, the colonies largely disregarded the 
Act although the formation of the Sons of Liberty, an “inter-
colonial union for the purpose of resisting enforcement of the 
Stamp Act” [Morgan, 1973, p. 105], was complete by the end of 
that year. Fueled by the rhetoric of the Sons of Liberty, public 
opinion turned towards securing the resignation of the stamp 
officers prior to the starting date of November 1, 1765. By mid-
August 1765, riots had commenced and spread throughout the 
colonies [Schlesinger, 1935, p. 72]. Schlesinger was of the view 
that it was the ceaseless propaganda of the press which kept 
the public mind at fever pitch. In a letter to the commissioner 
of stamps, dated October 12, 1765, one of the victims, John 
Hughes, stamp distributor for Pennsylvania, said “the printers 
in each colony, almost without exception, stuffed their papers 
weekly for some time before with the most inflammatory pieces 
they could procure and excluded everything that tended to cool 
the minds of the people.” 
As previously noted, not all the colonies reacted in the same 
way to the Stamp Act, and in Pennsylvania, for example, Quaker 
conservatism prevailed and violent resistance was avoided 
[Newcomb, 1966, p. 272]. “Nova Scotia, alone of all the colonies 
on the seaboard, submitted without opposition to the laying 
of stamp duties. In her settlement there were no riots, no non-
importation agreements and apparently, except for Liverpool, no 
murmurs” [Weaver, 1904, 58]. In most of the colonies, there was 
serious rioting when the stamped paper arrived, and some of the 
stamped paper was seized and burned. The officially appointed 
stamp distributors found themselves to be in such a perilous 
situation that they resigned en masse, with the exception of the 
distributor in Georgia, George Angus, who arrived well-guarded 
in Georgia with the stamps in late 1765. During January 1766, 
about 60 ships offloaded stamped paper in Savannah. This ac-
tivity angered the other colonies and also those inhabitants of 
Georgia not resident in Savannah, “for their betrayal of Ameri-
can unity” [Koeppel, 1962, p. 10]. Learning that there was to be 
a mob march on Savannah, the governor dispatched the stamps 
out to a British warship. Koeppel records that the stamps were 
used in Quebec, Nova Scotia, Florida, and some of the West 
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Indian colonies, namely Antigua, Barbados, Grenada, and Ja-
maica.
Spindel [1977] analyzes, in particular, the reaction of the 
colonies in the British West Indies.19 On the whole, their re-
sponse was moderate in comparison with the mainland colonies 
although, even in the West Indies, “the response of each colony 
was unique, determined by differences in history and environ-
ment.” 20 The government in the West Indies was similar to 
that in North America with some inevitable differences based 
largely on demographic factors, such as smaller populations and 
higher proportions of slaves. In addition, the chief executives 
in the West Indies enjoyed significant financial privileges and 
had powerful representatives in London. Other forces which 
underlined the differences between the Caribbean colonies and 
North American colonies included the “lack of cultural life, the 
scarcity of land, geographic isolation, a debilitating climate, and 
exposure to attacks from French and Spanish ships” [Spindel, 
1977, p. 207]. Throughout the colonies, both mainland and is-
land, stamp officials were attacked and abused, stamp distribu-
tors burned in effigy and their families threatened, and stamped 
paper was stolen and destroyed.
Numerous petitions were received from America and, in 
February 1766, the House of Commons appointed a parliamen-
tary committee to inquire into the operation of the Stamp Act. 
Before the committee reported, Grenville was dismissed from 
office and, following some difficult negotiations, administration 
was formed under the Marquis of Rockingham for whom Ed-
mund Burke acted as private secretary. 
The depth of colonial resistance to the Stamp Act, albeit 
not uniform, rendered it impossible to enforce. It became clear 
to the new ministry that compliance with the stamp duty could 
not be obtained. The question arose as to whether, given that the 
Stamp Act was not self-enforcing as originally envisaged, mili-
19 In 1765, the British colonies in the West Indies were the Bahamas, Jamaica, 
and the lesser Antilles, comprising Anguilla, Antigua, Barbados, Barbuda, Domi-
nica, Grenada, Montserrat, Nevis, St. Kitts, St. Vincent, Tobago, and Tortola.
20 Reaction varied across the island colonies. Jamaica and Barbados, for ex-
ample, showed only token resistance to the Stamp Act. In St. Kitts, however, the 
reaction against the Stamp Act was more violent. Stamped papers stored at a 
merchant’s house were torched by a mob of some 300-400 people, and the stamp 
distributor, William Tuckett, was forced to resign his post. The St. Kitts authori-
ties apparently made no effort to enforce the Act, and the St. Christopher Gazette 
was published unstamped throughout the period of operation of the Stamp Act 
[Spindel, 1977].
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tary force should be used to secure compliance [Bullion, 1992]. 
Following the report of the parliamentary committee and subse-
quent debate, the decision was taken to repeal the Stamp Act. As 
Bullion [1992] concludes, “[w]hen their expectations of Ameri-
can acquiescence proved incorrect, the majority of the cabinet 
were too familiar with the difficulties of a military response and 
too unimpressed with the Stamp Act to favor a confrontation.”
The committee noted that insurrection had taken place in 
some of the North American colonies, and that the insurrection 
had been encouraged by resolutions of the colonial assemblies 
in the respective provinces. The committee resolved that these 
matters be put before the King with a request that he direct the 
governors of the colonies to find the principal trouble makers 
and punish them. The King was also to be asked to instruct the 
governors to recommend to the assemblies that recompense be 
made to those who had suffered loss during the insurrection. 
The committee resolved finally that “the Parliament of Great 
Britain had, hath and of Right ought to have, full Power and 
Authority to make Laws and Statutes of sufficient Force and 
Validity, To bind the Colonies and Peoples of America – subjects 
of the Crown of Great Britain in all cases whatsoever” [BM Add 
Ms 33030 f.74].
The merchants in the House of Commons were naturally 
foremost among the advocates of the repeal and, according to 
Namier [1966, p. 254], only “six only out of some 52” voted for 
repeal. On division, the resolution for the repeal of the Stamp 
Act was approved by 275 votes to 167, and the resulting bill 
repealing the Stamp Act was given royal assent on March 18, 
1766. 
The repeal of the Stamp Act by the Rockingham ministry 
should not be read as acceptance of the American view. Indeed, 
according to Thomas [1975, p. 33], the repeal came about be-
cause of “an unusual combination of circumstances, not through 
widespread support for the colonial cause. In the general context 
of British political attitudes towards America, it was a mislead-
ing fluke.” The repeal was accompanied by a declaratory act 
which set out the right of Parliament to pass laws binding on 
the American colonies [Plumb, 1963, p. 127; Beloff, 1965]. Wil-
liam Pitt had attacked the Stamp Act on the basis that England 
had no right to impose internal taxes in America, and its repeal 
has been attributed to his efforts [Dowell, 1888, p. 154]. In notes 
for a Speech on the Declaratory Resolution, Burke said [Langford, 
1981, p. 47]:
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The situation extended from between the Tropicks to 
the pole in such an Extent in such Situations and under 
such a variety of Circumstances, that it would be im-
possible to govern them all upon a plan of Government 
settled even there. Taxation the nicest part of Domestic 
polity, so that Had the Question been now before us to 
form a new Plan of Polity for our Colonies, it would be 
right totally to leave the affair of internal Taxation to 
themselves.
In the breadth of the duties encompassing nearly all legal 
transactions as well as newspapers and pamphlets, Grenville 
had impinged on “each nerve centre in American life at which 
either economic or intellectual activity was registered” [Pole, 
1973, p. 42]. The anticipated revenue had been estimated at 
between £60,000 and £100,000 per year but, according to Dowell 
[1888], and as confirmed by the accounts in Figure 1, the actual 
yield was £3,000 in 1767 and £1,000 in 1768 plus a bitter legacy 
of resistance.
As noted by Preston [2006, p. 572] in the context of the Nav-
ajo, action at a distance may be well intentioned, here bringing 
the colonists into the imperial fiscal web, but may nonetheless 
“become a brutal fact to those upon whom it is enacted,” reveal-
ing a fatal mismatch between “global and local logics.” 
THE AFTERMATH
Following the repeal of the Stamp Act, it remained to deal 
with the shipping back the unused stamped paper and parch-
ment not destroyed in the disturbances. This process took some 
time with Figure 5, an expanded version of Figure 3, demon-
strating how it played out. In October 1766, the stamped paper 
and parchment that had not been sent to America was ordered 
to be “made usefull [sic] to Britain” by having the stamp cut 
off so that it could be re-used [Koeppel, 1976, 15]. Figure 3 (re-
peated as the top half of Figure 5) is an extract from the account 
of the warehouse keeper of stamped goods charged with receipt 
of the returned paper from America. Following the repeal, this 
officer was discharged from his obligations by the cancellation 
of the stamps and removal of the paper into the hands of the 
warehouse keeper of unstamped goods.
Figure 6 shows that the paper was sold back to the stationer 
who had supplied it in the first instance to be re-used in Britain. 
This process took some time, consignments being delivered over 
the course of the period from 1767-1772.
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FIGURE 5
Warehouse Keeper of Stampt Goods
1765 £ s D 1765 £ s D
Oct 31st to Stampt 
goods received 
from the Teller
222,506 11 6½ Oct 31st By sundry consignments 172,586 11 1¾ 
Sept 3rd 
Commissioners 
order paid receiver 
general for stamps
17 17 8
1766
Oct 14th 
Do for parchment 
and paper 
cancelled
49,902 2 8¾ 
222,506 11 6½ 1766 222,506 11 6½ 
Nov 29th
Commissioners 
orders to discharge 
the returns same 
having been 
cancelled
23,924 12 6½ 
1767
June 16th Ditto 19,533 10
8½
Sept 8th Ditto 11,440 1 3¼
1768
April 12th Ditto 39,848 6
6¾
1769
Sept 26th Ditto 10,391 17
8¼
Returns from the 
several distributors 105,138 8 9¼ 105,138 8 9¼
Source: N.A.: AO3/1086
Earlier, Figure 4 showed how the consignments of stamped 
paper were allocated among various colonial distributors. The 
remainder of this abstract, reproduced as Figure 7, shows 
which colonies collected the tax, which returned the paper and 
parchment, and which “mislaid” it during the disturbances. The 
abstract shows cash received from the distributors in Quebec, 
Montreal, West Florida, Jamaica, St. Kitts, Barbados, and Geor-
gia.
Finally on this point, the accounts in Figure 1 show that 
stamped paper to the value of approximately £155,000 was 
cancelled. Without the underlying working papers, it is not im-
mediately apparent what constitutes this total, given that to the 
distributors’ abstract, returns totaled only £105,138. The dif-
ference may represent paper and parchment which had not yet 
been dispatched to the colonies.
32
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 35 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/5
133Oats and Sadler, The Stamp Act Crisis
F
IG
U
R
E
 6
W
ar
eh
o
u
se
 K
ee
p
er
 o
f 
U
n
st
am
p
ed
 G
o
o
d
s
17
65
£
s
D
17
65
£
s
D
A
u
g 
2n
d
To
 J
ac
ob
 T
on
so
n
 &
 C
o
3,
59
9
8
11
O
ct
 3
1s
B
y 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
s 
or
d
er
 t
o 
d
el
iv
er
 t
o 
To
n
so
n
 &
 C
o 
th
ey
 
h
av
in
g 
p
ai
d
 f
or
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e
3,
77
6
14
4½
 
O
ct
 3
1s
t
D
it
to
33
7
7
6
D
is
co
u
n
t 
th
er
eo
n
14
2
19
4½
17
2
8
3,
97
6
16
5
3,
97
6
16
5
17
66
17
67
O
ct
 1
4t
h
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
s 
or
d
er
 t
o 
ch
ar
ge
 
fo
r 
go
od
s 
u
se
fu
ll
 f
or
 B
ri
ta
in
52
8
10
3¼
F
eb
 1
0t
h
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
s 
or
d
er
 t
o 
d
el
iv
er
 t
o 
R
ic
h
d
 T
on
so
n
 &
 C
o 
go
od
s 
u
se
fu
ll
 
fo
r 
B
ri
ta
in
38
5
1
5
N
ov
 
29
th
D
it
to
15
8
13
2¾
 
M
ay
 2
1s
t
D
it
to
42
15
6
17
67
Ju
n
e 
16
th
D
it
to
39
10
8
Ju
ly
 3
1s
t
D
it
to
46
16
9½
 
17
68
M
ar
ch
 
24
th
D
it
to
18
4
8
3
N
ov
 7
th
D
it
to
30
6
9½
17
69
S
ep
t  
26
th
 
D
it
to
36
10
-
17
68
F
eb
 6
th
D
it
to
18
12
9
Ju
n
e 
3r
d
D
it
to
16
3
5
6
S
ep
t  8
th
D
it
to
16
5
-
33
Oats and Sadler: Accounting for the Stamp Act crisis
Published by eGrove, 2008
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2008134
F
IG
U
R
E
 6
 (co
n
tin
u
ed
)
£
s
D
£
s
D
1769
Jan
y 19
th
D
itto
51
14
3
M
arch
 9
th
D
itto
31
7
9
M
ay 23
rd
D
itto
16
1
1½
S
ep
t 8
th
D
itto
17
11
-
1770
F
eb
y 8
th
D
itto
41
19
4
A
u
g
t 16
th
D
itto
7
-
-
16
th
D
itto
7
14
9
1771
Jan
y 15
th
D
itto
6
-
-
A
p
ril 6
th
D
itto
51
3
-
1772
F
eb
y 14
th
D
itto
6
17
5 ½
 
940
12
5
940
12
5
S
ou
rce: N
.A
.: A
O
3/1086
34
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 35 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol35/iss2/5
135Oats and Sadler, The Stamp Act Crisis
FIGURE 7
Distributors’ Abstract (extract)
Districts Cash Returns Transfers Balances
£ s D £ s D £ s D £ s D
Connecticut - - - - - 6,793 8 4¼ - - - - - 1,909 10 11
New Hants - - - - - 1,657 7 - - - - - 2,488 17 7
Pensilvania - - - - - 7,950 10 9 - - - - - 3,902 4
Quebec 316 10 8 4,437 4 2¾ 84 2 8 2,097 5 3½
Virginia - - - - - 4,948 6 7½ - - - - - 4,735 13 7
Montreal 273 3 9 2,587 15 9 1,039 5 - 2,073 1 ¼
Nova Scotia - - - - - 473 14 4¾ - - - - - 1,133 7 5½
New Jersey - - - - - 3,552 8 6½ - - - - - 1,859 19 4½
Marylands - - - - - 4,948 6 7½ - - - - - 2,479 14 10
Grenada - - - - - 3,219 1 8½ - - - - - 756 4 ½
West Florida 50 - - 2,797 15 4 - - - - - 138 1 4½
North Carolina - - - - - 4,966 11 7½ - - - - - 2,479 14 10
New York - - - - - 181 3 - - - - - - 8
Boston New England - - - - - 8,245 17 5¾ - - - - - 4,167 19 2½
Rhode Island - - - - - 3,236 8 9 - - - - - 3,823 1 7
Bermudas - - - - - 1,199 4 2¼ - - - - - 786 16 6
Bahama - - - - - 1,986 - 8¼ - - - - - - - - - -
Spanish Town Jamaica 2,097 2 - 5,953 12 4½ - - - - - 7,730 7
South Carolina - - - - - 11 3½ - - - - - - - - - -
Antigua - - - - - 5,486 8 - - - - - 2,275 10 ¼
St Kitts 8 13 6 4,100 3 11 - - - - - 3,711 7 6
Barbadoes 500 - - 18 5 - - - - - 579 14 6
Georgia 45 - - 3,820 6 7¾ - - - - - 285 15 5¾
East Florida - - - - - 1,000 1 2½ - - - - - 1,985 15 6
3,292 9 11 8 9¼ 1,123 7 8 12 5½
Source: N.A.: AO3/1086
OBSERVATIONS ON THE STAMP ACT ACCOUNTS
The final account is shown in Figure 1. Aspects of that ac-
count remain unresolved. We have been unable to ascertain 
the nature of the two entries for “incidents,” £371.16s.11d. and 
£335.1s.8d. respectively, but this possibly includes some element 
of compensation paid to distributors and ship owners who lost 
money during the disturbances. There were several petitions 
to Parliament seeking such compensation, but whether these 
would be reflected in the accounts is uncertain. One such peti-
tion related to damages of £55.10s. for additional expenses 
incurred as a result of having to unload stamped paper up-
river from the port as a result of danger from the disturbances 
[T1/479 ff 223-224]. It certainly appears, furthermore, that the 
accounts do not include a bill from the solicitor of the Stamp 
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Office, Thomas Cruwys, for the drafting of the Stamp Bill.
As is clear from Figure 1, the accounts produced in 1772 
are in charge-discharge form. This was the prevailing form for 
government accounting during the 18th century, not only in 
Britain but also in Continental Europe. It was not until the first 
half of the 19th century that attempts were made to standardize 
government accounts using double-entry bookkeeping [Edwards 
and Greener, 2003]. Lemarchand [1994, pp. 193-194] examines 
the transition to double-entry bookkeeping from charge and 
discharge in France during the 18th century and notes that 
mineral and metallurgy operations did not make the transition, 
most probably because they were, in large part, financed by the 
nobility and financiers for whom charge and discharge was a 
more familiar system. The essence of charge and discharge is 
stewardship accounting, based on the separation of ownership 
of capital and management and couched in terms of responsi-
bility, accountability, and control. “The initial framework [of 
charge and discharge] was the control of those in charge of han-
dling royal or seigniorial funds or in the running of the domain. 
This was much more than a method of bookkeeping, it was a 
way of rendering accounts.” Charge and discharge goes beyond 
cash accounting; the accountant “takes charge of everything he 
receives, either at the outset of his management or during it. He 
is discharged for all expenditure made for the purposes of such 
management and then must settle the balance.” The process was 
geared to ensuring the integrity of the accountant through the 
obligation to render a final account subject to auditing.
Lacombe-Saboly [1997, p. 271] examines the accounting 
systems of three French hospitals in the 18th and 19th centuries 
and finds that, in the pre-revolutionary period, the same model 
was used as that of French bankers and public accountants (i.e., 
charge and discharge). Movements in funds were recorded in 
monetary units, even where actually exchanged in kind. “The ac-
counting organization seems to have been conceived for submit-
ting accounts to the management committee and supervisors, 
and not merely for the gathering of information.” Lacombe-
Saboly concludes that the system in use satisfied the need for 
information. It was not used to record debtors and creditors in 
the way that private merchants accounts did, and it seems that 
the recording of receipts and expenditure was sufficient for the 
needs of the hospital management.
Similar features can be noted in the colonial Stamp Act ac-
counts. In particular, for the final account (Figure 1), the charge 
is for the value that the stamped paper was expected to realize 
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on sale, not the cost of its purchase and the stamping process. 
The final account is also supported by subsidiary accounts show-
ing the charge and discharge at other stages in the process. 
Holmes [1979] examines government accounting in colo-
nial Massachusetts and, as part of his analysis, considers the 
Treasurer’s books of account from 1754. While underpinned by 
double-entry subsidiary accounts kept in the Italian method, 
the reports of the fiscal position of the colony to the legislature 
adopted charge-and-discharge format. Holmes corresponded 
with Yamey regarding his findings, who apparently tentatively 
confirmed that such accounts were unlikely to have been used 
anywhere in Europe by government departments at that time. 
It seems unlikely, therefore, that the underlying accounts for the 
Stamp Act would have been kept in double-entry form.
CONCLUSION
The attempt by Britain to levy a stamp duty on the Ameri-
can colonies is an extraordinary episode in fiscal history. Unlike 
other instances of tax-related rebellion [see Burg, 2004, for a 
comprehensive analysis], however, it concerned not domestic 
impositions but a new tax levied across vast geographical dis-
tances. Careful planning, sympathy with local conditions, and an 
attempt to enlist the support of the colonies in its execution may 
have assisted a successful implementation of the Stamp Act, but 
clearly these issues were not sufficiently understood by the Brit-
ish Parliament. The episode stands as an example of how a tax 
instrument which is successful in one setting will not necessarily 
have the same effectiveness when transposed into another. The 
tax displayed characteristics of a sovereign power as evidenced 
by the inspection regime by which it was enforced, and the po-
tential penalty of death without benefit of clergy for those found 
to be forging stamps. The tax also, however, displayed character-
istics of a disciplinary power, requiring taxpayers to be complicit 
in its collection.21 This holds true for the British version of the 
tax and explains in part its success at a time when other forms 
of taxation, specifically tax on incomes, were unthinkable. In the 
case of the imperial version, the government failed to enroll lo-
cal actors to the extent necessary to make the tax work in prac-
tice at a distance.
By examining the literature, we have shown that the signal 
failure of the Stamp Act is due to a number of contributing fac-
21 These concepts of power are derived from Foucault [1979].
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tors. Some of these are discussed extensively in the existing lit-
erature of the Stamp Act crisis. For example, the British Parlia-
ment failed to appreciate that the relationship between Britain 
and the colonists was perceived in an increasingly different way 
by both parties. In the British view, the right to tax was disasso-
ciated with the right to parliamentary representation at the time 
when only a small proportion of Englishmen themselves were 
represented. Distinguishing as they did between internal and 
external taxes, the American colonists were prepared to accept 
duties whose main purpose was to regulate trade. They were 
far less inclined to accept a stamp tax regarded as an interfer-
ence with their internal affairs. As a result of the differences in 
outlook, the British government underestimated the depth of 
the feeling against imperial taxation in any form. Communica-
tion delays rendered the implementation of the tax problematic 
and contributed further to the tensions in the colonies. Most 
importantly, the timing of the attempt to tax the colonies was 
misjudged. Had earlier proposals, made as early as 1720, been 
implemented, the colonists may not have been so quick to reject 
it, but, by 1765, a growing sense of independence meant that any 
form of taxation, no matter how carefully chosen, was bound to 
interfere with that trend.
In this paper, we posit an additional explanation for the 
failure of the imperial Stamp Act, which relates to the capacity 
of the chosen fiscal instrument to galvanize a violent resistance 
movement. We argue that the logistics of implementing a highly 
complex form of taxation across vast geographical distances 
were completely underestimated by Parliament, demonstrating 
the failure to enact action at a distance. Even with the full coop-
eration of the colonists, it would have been extremely difficult 
to manage the efficient operation of the Act and to reap the 
expected revenue. More careful consideration of the different 
economic and social conditions in the colonies and how these 
would impact the implementation of the tax may have led to a 
different design.
A number of features of the Stamp Act operations contrib-
uted to its rejection by some of the colonies. While stopping 
short of a counterfactual argument, we note a number of possi-
bilities. Had the colonies been allowed to stamp their own paper 
(i.e., paper made in the colonies), the need to ship large bales of 
stamped papers across the Atlantic would have been avoided. 
The colonists would not then have been faced with such visible 
evidence of imperial interference and would have been deprived 
of the opportunity to demonstrate disapproval in such an in-
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flammatory way. In addition, the costs of producing newspapers 
and other publications would not have been increased to such 
an extent. Another feature relates to the choice of objects to be 
taxed. Had the tax not been imposed on newspapers, pamphlets, 
and almanacs, the printers may not have incited resistance 
through the publication of inflammatory tracts. 
Furthermore, had the British government paid heed to the 
way in which the colonies were taxing themselves, the overlay of 
stamp duties on items such as licenses to practice law or a pro-
fession, already subject to faculty tax, could have been avoided. 
Massachusetts, in particular, was heavily taxed at the time 
through a variety of different instruments.
Through the examination of primary source documents, 
this paper shows the way in which the British government bu-
reaucracy drew up the accounts for the American stamp and 
demonstrates that it was not designed to “calculate the loss.” 
Rather the accounts are charge-and-discharge accounts which 
reflect the stewardship obligations imposed on those responsible 
for the collection of the tax, consistent with the residual feudal 
mentality still extant in the mid-18th century.
Finally, the examination of the accounts drawn up by the 
British government some six years after the abolition of the 
stamp duty provides insight into the nature of government ac-
counting in the mid-18th century while underscoring both the 
unnecessarily complicated nature of administering the impost 
and the depth of its failure.
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